Reframing Convergent and Divergent Thought for the 21st Century by Gabora, Liane
Gabora, L. (2019). Reframing convergent and divergent thought for the 21st Century. In A. Goel, C. Seifert, & C. Freska 
(Eds.), Proceedings of 41st Annual Meeting of the Cognitive Science Society. 
Reframing Convergent and Divergent Thought for the 21st Century 
Liane Gabora (liane.gabora@ubc.ca) 
Department of Psychology, University of British Columbia 
Kelowna BC, V1V 1V7, CANADA 
Abstract 
Convergent and divergent thought are promoted as key 
constructs of creativity. Convergent thought is defined and 
measured in terms of the ability to perform on tasks where 
there is one correct solution, and divergent thought is defined 
and measured in terms of the ability to generate multiple 
solutions. However, these characterizations of convergent and 
divergent thought presents inconsistencies, and do not capture 
the reiterative processing, or ‘honing’ of an idea that 
characterizes creative cognition. Research on formal models 
of concepts and their interactions suggests that different 
creative outputs may be projections of the same underlying 
idea at different phases of a honing process. This leads us to 
redefine convergent thought as thought in which the relevant 
concepts are considered from conventional contexts, and 
divergent thought as thought in which they are considered 
from unconventional contexts. Implications for the assessment 
of creativity are discussed. 
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Introduction 
Other species perceive, make decisions, and take action, but 
our ability to adapt ideas to our own needs, tastes, and 
perspectives, and express ourselves through language, art, 
technology, and other means, is exceptional. Thus, 
understanding creative thinking is central to understanding 
our humanness.  
In creativity research, as in other areas of cognitive 
science, there is a long history of dual process theories, 
which assert that there are two kinds of thought, or that 
thought varies along a continuum between two extremes 
(Evans & Frankish, 2009; James, 1890/1950, Sloman, 
1996). In the creativity literature the distinction is usually 
made between convergent and divergent thinking1. 
Convergent thought is defined and measured in terms of the 
ability to perform on tasks where there is a single correct 
solution, while divergent thought is defined and measured in 
terms of the ability to generate multiple different 
solutions (Guilford, 1967). A widely used test of convergent 
thinking is the Remote Associates Test (RAT) (Mednick, 
1968). A typical RAT question is: What is the common 
1 Sometimes the distinction is between associative and analytic 
thought (e.g., Chrusch, C. & Gabora, L., 2013), or executive 
versus generative (e.g., Ellamil, Dobson, Beeman, & Christoff, 
2012). See (Sowden et al., 2014) for how convergent and 
divergent thinking relate to other dual process theories.  
associate of TANK, TABLE, and HILL? The answer is: 
TOP. A widely used divergent thinking test is the Alternate 
Uses task, which asks questions like ‘think of as many uses 
as you can for a brick’ (Christensen, Guilford, Merrifield, & 
Wilson, 1960). Responses are most often rated in terms of 
fluency, the total number of ideas generated in a given time. 
Often they are additionally rated in terms of originality, the 
number of unusual or statistically infrequent ideas. Fluency 
and originality are considered to reflect the quantity and 
quality of ideation performance, respectively. Occasionally 
they are also rated in terms of flexibility, the number of 
different categories of ideas. On rare occasions answers are 
rated for elaboration: the amount of detail given, or 
evidence that the individual has followed an associative 
pathway for some distance. 
Although these characterizations of convergent and 
divergent thought have stuck for half a century, as 
formulated, they present inconsistencies. For example, it is 
often said that a creatively demanding problem requires 
both convergent and divergent thought (e.g., Beersma & De 
Dreu, 2005; Gibson, Folley, & Park, 2009; Kerr & Murthy, 
2004). However, given that convergent and divergent 
thought are defined in terms of the number of correct 
solutions, this makes no sense. A problem either has one 
correct solution or it has many; it cannot have both one and 
many. Moreover, the way convergent and divergent thought 
have been defined and measured is inconsistent with how 
people think about creativity; for example, although 
divergent thinking is thought to be the most promising 
candidate for the foundation of creative ability (Plucker & 
Renzulli, 1999; Runco, 2007), performance on the RAT 
would seem to be a better indicator of creativity than many 
tasks that would be classified as a divergent thinking task, 
such as ‘list as many things as you can that are red’. Finally, 
it is often noted that earlier responses on a divergent 
thinking task are less creative than latter ones (Beaty & 
Silvia, 2012), but if divergent thinking is characterized in 
terms of the number of possible responses, this is the 
opposite of what one should expect, because with each 
response one gives, the number of remaining possible 
responses decreases by one. Thus, the conventional view 
would predict that, as one proceeds, one should start 
thinking more convergently, not more divergently.  
More fundamentally, as noted elsewhere (Piffer, 2012), 
divergent thinking research, and creativity research in 
general, emphasizes the generation of multiple ideas over 
what is sometimes called honing—recursively reflecting on 
a question or idea by viewing it from different perspectives 
 with the output of each such reflection providing the input 
to the next (Gabora, 2007, 2017). One thereby comes to a 
deeper, more nuanced understanding of it. Honing differs 
from elaboration in that it does not include additions or 
modifications to the idea that are tacked on willy-nilly; it 
refers specifically to modifications that arise in response to 
an overarching conceptual framework that is shepherding2 
the creative process. The structure of this overarching 
framework reflects the individual’s worldview: their self-
organizing web of understandings about their world and 
their place in that world (in other words, the creator’s mind 
as experienced ‘from the inside’).  
Like other self-organizing systems, a worldview 
continually interacts with and adapts to its environment to 
minimize internal entropy, a measure of uncertainty and 
internal disorder. Hirsh, Mar, and Peterson (2012) use the 
term psychological entropy to refer to anxiety-provoking 
uncertainty, which they claim humans attempt to keep at a 
manageable level. Noting that uncertainty can be 
experienced not just negatively as anxiety but also 
positively as a wellspring for creativity (or both), the term 
psychological entropy has been expanded to refer to 
arousal-provoking uncertainty. Redefining psychological 
entropy in terms of arousal rather than anxiety is consistent 
with findings that creative individuals exhibit greater 
openness to experience and higher tolerance of ambiguity 
(Feist, 1998), which could predispose them to states of 
uncertainty or worldview inconsistency (Gabora, 1999). 
Their higher variability in arousal (Martindale & 
Armstrong, 1974) reflects a predisposition to invite 
situations that increase psychological entropy, experience 
them positively, and resolve them. In this way, 
psychological entropy—a macro-level variable acting at the 
level of the worldview as a whole—generates emotions that 
play a role in guiding and monitoring creative tasks.  
Thus, honing continues until psychological entropy 
decreases to an acceptable level. In Piagetian terms, during 
honing the individual assimilates each new understanding of 
the idea, and the individual’s worldview changes to 
accommodate this new understanding. Insight is then 
explained in terms of self-organized criticality (SOC) 
(Gabora, 2001, 2017; Schilling, 2005), a phenomenon 
wherein, through simple local interactions, complex systems 
tend to find a critical state poised at the cusp of a transition 
between order and chaos, from which a single small 
perturbation occasionally exerts a disproportionately large 
effect (Bak, Tang, & Weisenfeld, 1988). Thus, while most 
thoughts have little effect on one’s worldview, an idea we 
call insightful is one for which one thought triggers another, 
which triggers another, and so forth in an avalanche of 
conceptual change. 
Surely, whether one is writing a novel, or composing a 
symphony, or inventing a new kind of solar panel, this kind 
of honing process is central to the creative act. Moreover, 
the ability to hone an idea may have little to do with the 
                                                           
2 This word is chosen deliberately because it implies that the 
process is neither entirely top-down nor entirely bottom-up. 
ability (or patience) to engage in a futile exercise like 
coming up with uses for a brick, or things that are red. A 
refinement on conventional measures of divergent thinking, 
in which participants indicate what they think are their two 
most creative answers, and these answers are rated on a 5-
point scale, shows good reliability and high predictive 
validity without the fluency confound (Silvia et al, 2008). 
However, one could still score highly on this version of the 
test without having engaged in honing. 
Our conception of convergent and divergent thinking may 
be distorted by our everyday experience in the physical 
world; because objects in the world exist in different places 
and have distinct, definite boundaries, it may be difficult to 
wean ourselves from the intuition that ideas in the mind do 
as well. It has been argued on the basis of evidence from 
research on the attributes of associative memory, that the 
common assumption that creativity involves searching 
through a space of discrete, separate possibilities, selecting 
the best, and tweaking it, is misleading (Gabora, 2007, 
2010, 2018). This is also what is suggested by research on 
the formal structure of concepts and their interactions. The 
goal of the rest of this paper is to, without going into 
mathematical details, show how this research on concepts 
points to a new conception of convergent and divergent 
thinking that resolves the above inconsistencies, and 
potentially catalyzes a deeper understanding of how the 
creative process works.  
The approach to concepts that I will draw upon is 
sometimes (somewhat unfortunately) referred to as the 
quantum approach (Aerts, Gabora, & Sozzo, 2013; Aerts & 
Gabora, 2005; Blutner, Pothos, & Bruza, 2013; Busemeyer 
& Bruza, 2012; Busemeyer & Wang, 2018;; Gabora, 2001; 
Gabora & Aerts, 2002; Pothos, Busemeyer, Shiffrin, & 
Yearsley, 2017). It is called this not because it has anything 
to do with quantum particles, but because it uses 
generalizations of mathematical structures originally 
developed for quantum mechanics. The motivation and 
rationale for this approach are provided elsewhere (Aerts, 
Broekaert, Gabora, & Sozzo, 2016b; Bruza, Busemeyer, & 
Gabora, 2009). For now it is noted that this research by no 
means aims to reduce cognitive psychology to physics. 
Rather, much as was the case with other branches of 
mathematics such as complexity theory and even number 
theory, structures originally developed by physicists were 
later found to have applications in other domains. In the 
quantum approach, concepts are viewed not as fixed 
representations or identifiers, but as bridges between mind 
and world that are sensitive to context and that 
actively participate in the generation of meaning (Gabora, 
Rosch, & Aerts, 2008). 
Potentiality, Context, and Creative Thought 
The gist of the new view of creative thought suggested by 
concepts research is conveyed by the photograph below of a 
woodcutting with light shining on it from three different 
directions, yielding three differently shaped shadows: that of 
a G, an E, and a B (Figure 1). Though each shadow is 
 different, they are all projections of the same underlying 
object. We could say that the woodcutting has the 
potentiality to actualize different ways, and to actualize in 
one of these ways requires an observable or context, in this 
case, light shining from a particular direction. We can refer 
to the state of the woodcutting when no light is shining on it 
as its ground state. While it is tempting to assume that a 
bout of creative thought entails the generation of multiple 
distinct, separate ideas, there may be a single underlying 
mental representation that, like the woodcuttings, is ill-
defined, and affords some degree of ambiguity in its 
interpretation. Just because the different sketches of a 
painting, or prototypes of an invention, take different forms 
when expressed in the physical world, that doesn’t mean 
they derive from different underlying ideas in the mind. Just 
as the three shadows of each of the two woodcuttings in 
Figure 1 are projections of the same underlying object, the 
sketches or prototypes may be different external realizations 
of the same underlying idea at different stages of a creative 
honing process. In other words, these different outputs are 
different articulations of the idea as it appears looked at 
from different perspectives. Midway through a creative 
thought process one may have an inkling of an idea but not 
yet know whether, or exactly how, it could work. Because it 
is ‘half-baked’, it may be more vulnerable to interpretation, 
meaning that it could appear quite different when looked at 
from a different perspective.  
 
 
Figure 1: Photograph of ambiguous woodcuttings taken 
from the front cover of ‘Gödel, Escher, Bach: An Eternal 
Golden Braid’ by Douglas Hofstadter (1979). The top ‘trip-
let’ (as he calls them) is not simply a rotated version of the 
one below it; it is a different shape. (Used with permission.) 
 
Note that the two woodcuttings in Figure 1 have two 
different shapes, yet they yield the same three shadows. To 
distinguish the shape of the woodcutting above from the 
woodcutting below would require that light be shown on 
them from still more angles, casting shadows that would not 
look like any particular letters we know. Similarly, the more 
complex one’s unborn creative idea, the more honing steps 
required to discern its underlying form and whittle it down 
as needed. Since it has the potential to manifest different 
ways, we can say that it is a state of potentiality. 
In the quantum approach to concepts, this kind of 
potentiality is described as a superposition state represented 
by a vector in a complex Hilbert space. Concepts act as 
contexts for each other that alter how they are experienced; 
for example, the concept TREE might make you think of a 
deciduous tree (one with leaves), but in the context 
CHRISTMAS, you might think of a coniferous tree (one 
with needles and cones). Each possible context may 
actualize the potentiality of the concept differently, and 
these possible actualizations are represented by basis states. 
The actual, existing context is treated as an observable that 
determines how the concept changes in light of this context. 
It might change in such a way as to alter the weights of 
certain properties. (For example, ‘talks’ and ‘lives in a cage’ 
are not considered properties of BIRD but they are 
considered properties of PET BIRD  (Hampton, 1987); thus, 
the context PET is influencing the properties we ascribe to 
BIRD.) A context can also alter the typicalities of certain 
exemplars. (As a canonical example, guppy is not 
considered a typical exemplar of PET, nor of FISH, but it is 
considered a typical exemplar of PET FISH (Osherson & 
Smith, 1981).) In the absence of any observable—i.e., when 
a concept is not being viewed from any particular context, 
or thought about at all—the concept is said to be in a ground 
state. In its ground state there are no properties associated 
with the concept, but also, there are no properties that are, a 
priori, excluded from it; thus, you could say it is a state of 
infinite potentiality. Conceptual change due to the impact of 
a context is modeled as collapse of the vector representing 
the concept to one of its basis state, as shown in Figure 2.  
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 Figure 2: A graphical depiction of a vector |Ψ representing 
the concept TREE is shown in black. In the default context, 
TREE may be more likely to collapse to projection vector 
|d which represents DECIDUOUS TREE (tree with leaves) 
than to collapse to projection vector |c which represents 
CONIFEROUS TREE (tree with needles and cones). This 
can be seen by the fact that subspace a0 is smaller than 
subspace a1; i.e., a0 is closer to the xy origin than a1. In the 
context CHRISTMAS, shown in blue, the concept TREE is 
likely to collapse to the orthogonal projection vector |cC, 
representing CONIFEROUS TREE, as shown by the fact 
that b0 is larger than b1. (After collapse, the projected vector, 
|ΨC, is the same length as the original due to 
renormalization). 
 
This approach has enabled us to cope with some of the 
non-compositional ways in which people use concepts—
famously said to be the biggest challenge facing cognitive 
science (Fodor, 1998)—by describing them in terms of 
effects such as entanglement3 and interference4 (Aerts, 
Sozzo, & Gabora, 2016; Aerts & Sozzo, 2014; Busemeyer 
& Bruza, 2012). The approach can be applied to concept 
combinations and more complex compounds of concepts 
such as decisions (e.g., Busemeyer, Wang, & Townsend, 
2006; Yukalov & Sornette 2009) jokes (Gabora & Kitto, 
2017), worldviews (Gabora & Aerts, 2009), and creativity 
(e.g., Gabora & Carbert, 2015). For example, working with 
data from a study in which participants were asked to rate 
the typicality of exemplars of a concept for different 
contexts, and introducing a state-transition threshold, we 
built a model of how exemplars of a concept arise in 
divergent versus convergent modes of thought (Veloz, 
Gabora, Eyjolfson, & Aerts, 2011). By lowering a threshold 
of allowable deviation from the default context, seemingly 
atypical exemplars appeared as new possibilities. Honing an 
idea can be modeled as reiterated collapse, resulting in a 
change of state of the idea, which induces the conceptual 
framework to subject the idea to a new context, which in 
turn brings about a new collapse, and so forth, until the idea 
is sufficiently robust in the face of new contexts that it no 
longer undergoes change-of-state (Gabora, 2017). In short, 
it is becoming possible to move beyond crude conceptions 
of creative cognition to a more refined understanding that is 
aligned with and informed by advances in the adjacent area 
of concepts research. 
Redefining Convergent and Divergent Thought 
Let us now see how this can pave the way to a new 
conception of convergent and divergent thought. There is a 
relationship between the weights on the properties of a 
                                                           
3 Entanglement is a phenomenon first encountered in particle 
physics wherein the state of one entity cannot be described 
independently of the state of another, and any measurement 
performed on one influences the other.  
4 Interference is the annihilation of the crest of one wave by the 
trough of another when they interact. 
concept in a particular state, and its susceptibility to collapse 
to any particular new state. For example, if you think about 
TREE in terms of only its most typical properties such as 
‘grows in the ground’, your next thought may be about 
something else that grows in the ground, such as a 
FLOWER. However, if you think about TREE in a way that 
encompasses not just typical properties such as ‘grows in 
the ground’ but also atypical properties, and in particular 
those implied by the context, your next thought may be 
about something semantically distant from TREE; for 
example, a poet might think of a word that rhymes with 
TREE such as BEE. Recall how, in its ground state, there 
are no properties associated with a concept, but also, no 
properties excluded from it. This means that, for any 
concept there exists some context that could come along and 
make any given property become relevant. The more exotic 
the context, the more atypical the properties that are evoked, 
and thus the more unconventional the subsequent thought.  
This suggests that in convergent thought an idea is refined 
by considering compound of concepts in their conventional 
contexts. Because one is not concerned about all the remote 
ways in which the object of thought could be related to other 
things, but instead working with it in its most compact form, 
mental energy is left over for complex operations. This then 
is why convergent thought is conducive to unearthing 
relationships of causation, or thinking analytically, as well 
as simply carrying out rote tasks. 
Conversely, in divergent thought one reflects on an idea 
by considering a particular compound of concepts from 
unconventional contexts. This is conducive to unearthing 
relationships of correlation, i.e., forging new connections 
between seemingly unrelated areas, as in analogical 
thinking. Note that the more unconventional the contexts 
one calls up, the seemingly less sensible the next thought 
may be, and therefore the more honing that may be required 
to coax it into a form that eventually makes sense. It is for 
this reason that the products of divergent thought (as 
redefined here to mean thinking of ideas from 
unconventional contexts) may require extensive honing. 
Implications for Assessment 
On the basis of this view of convergent and divergent 
thinking, let us now re-examine the tests used to assess 
these constructs. Although the RAT (Mednick, 1968) is 
used to assess convergent thinking because each question 
only has one correct answer, to determine the common 
associate of TANK, TABLE, and HILL you have to think of 
at least one of these words in a context that is not its default 
context. For example, unless you are a retailer in the 
business of selling tank tops you likely interpret the word 
TANK in terms of its meaning as a military vehicle. 
Therefore, if we go with the redefinition of convergent 
thinking as mental operations wherein the contents of 
thought are viewed from conventional contexts, convergent 
thought is insufficient to solve the RAT. The RAT is 
actually more appropriately used as a test of divergent 
thinking. This is consistent with the RAT’s wide usage as a 
 test of creativity despite that convergent thought is 
contrasted with divergent thought and divergent thought is 
frequently equated with creativity.  
Since in divergent thinking tasks such as the Alternate 
Uses task people only reflect upon an idea from 
unconventional contexts after they have generated 
conventional responses, these tasks only test for divergent 
thinking during the latter part of the task. Thus it makes 
sense that, as noted by Beaty and Silvia (2012), this is when 
the most creative responses occur.  
Neither the RAT nor conventional divergent thinking tests 
assess the capacity to hone an idea in a reiterated manner 
such that uncertainty decreases to an acceptable level and 
the idea transitions from ill-defined to well-defined. 
Amobile’s (1982) consensual assessment technique, which 
involves asking multiple experts to evaluate the creativity of 
a work, is better in this regard, but it undoubtedly measures 
not just divergent thinking but what is sometimes called 
contextual focus: the capacity to spontaneously shift 
between convergent and divergent thought as needed, in 
response to the situation one is in (Gabora, 2010). What is 
required is a new approach to creativity testing in which 
each step in a creative process is broken down into a series 
of states and contexts, and the type and magnitude of 
conceptual change from one step to the next are analyzed so 
as to better understand the interplay of convergent and 
divergent thinking. Steps in this direction are underway 
using studies of artmaking (Choi & DiPaola, 2013) and 
computational models (Bell & Gabora, 2016; DiPaola, 
2017; DiPaola, Gabora, & McCaig, 2018; McCaig, DiPaola, 
& Gabora, 2016), as well as technologies such as functional 
magnetic resonance imaging (Jung & Vartanian, 2018). 
Conclusions 
The constructs of convergent and divergent thought have 
been around for half a century, and the way they are defined 
and measured has changed little in that time. Meanwhile, we 
have made headway in understanding the dynamics of the 
compounds of concepts that constitute ideas, and in 
modeling how they interact as one thought gives way to the 
next. Given the presence of inconsistences in how 
convergent and divergent thought are conventionally 
defined and measured, it seems appropriate to revise our 
understanding of them in light of recent advances in 
understanding the internal workings of these processes. This 
paper has shown how formal research on concepts can pave 
the way to a new way of defining, measuring, and thinking 
about convergent and divergent thought.  
Note that this is not the only potentially fruitful avenue 
for research yielded by a joining of forces between research 
on concepts and research on creativity. For example, there 
are hints that the above-mentioned presence of interference 
and entanglement effects in empirical studies of conceptual 
change are related to creativity, but to date this has not been 
systematically explored. Another direction for future 
research concerns the role of incubation: the idea that 
setting a creative task aside for a while, or incubating on it, 
can promote insight. One could model this as letting the 
idea return to its ground state such that it sheds its coterie of 
typical properties (and contexts), and taps into its reservoir 
of infinite potentiality (in the sense that no properties are 
definitively present nor absent). 
Another intriguing prospect this line of inquiry leads to is 
the following. Creative people are more subject to 
adoration, as well as social disapproval and even bullying, 
and it is generally assumed that this is because they violate 
social norms (Sternberg & Lubart, 1995). However, this 
may not be the whole story. I have suggested that the 
creative mind is in the process of honing ambiguous mental 
forms, and indeed it has long been thought that creative 
people are particularly comfortable with ambiguity (e.g., 
Tegano, 1990; but see also, Merrotsy, 2013). This may 
include ambiguity with respect to how they themselves 
come across, which in turn may make them more vulnerable 
to other people’s projections. In other words, they may be 
more subject to misinterpretation, appearing as Gods or 
Goddesses to some, and as devils to others. 
It is hoped that this paper has provided a glimpse of how 
formal models of concepts can play a key role in the 
development of a 21st Century understanding of this most 
human of abilities, the ability to create. 
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